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The questions of Adam Smith’s method have been tormenting Smith scholars for
long, mainly because Smith himself is not explicit about his own methodological
commitments. In this piece I will take up cues from Eric Schliesser’s discussion
and offer some afterthoughts. Smith emphasizes his reservations about political
arithmetick (Smith 1981: 534), and generally about the profound application of
mathematics in inquiry, natural or moral, because it does not suit the phenomena:
‘It rarely happens, that nature can be mathematically exact with regard to figure of
the objects she produces’ (Smith 1982: 95). Not surprising then, Smith’s method
is not mathematical: it is not driven by mathematical idealizations or theory-based
measurement and calculation, but by the comparative analysis of individual cases.
This does not entail, however, that mathematical reasoning is altogether missing
from Smith methodology: as Schliesser (2017: 115–118, 325–329) emphasizes,
setting up proportional relations between components of compound phenomena
plays a crucial role in his comparative method.
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Proportional reasoning plays a central role in inquiries conducted by Smith’s
philosophical friends: in Joseph Black’s ordering of elective attractions, in
William Cullen’s efforts to determine what is required for restoring animal econ-
omy to its healthy state, in David Hume’s analysis of the influence of concurrent
passions on behavior.1 And it is also there in Smith’s recipes for restoring the
health of the ‘body politick’ when ‘some of the vital parts are overgrown’ (Smith
1981: 605–6), but also in his account of our moral practice while making judg-
ments of propriety and merit (Smith 2002: 24–25). As Schliesser rightly points
out, judging proportionality is a mathematical skill that does not require advanced
mathematics, not even exact calculation. But it does require context-sensitive
judgment that cannot be regulated by mechanical rules of philosophizing, and so
it ascribes imagination a central role in inquiry: science for Smith is not ‘a mere
extension of common sense – there can be genuine discontinuities between the ex-
pert’s view of the world and common life’ (Schliesser 2017: 273). Specifying pro-
portions of components and following their fluctuations drives toward a dynamic
view of connecting principles and representing society as an organic system of
mutual influences that might not be visible from a common-sense point of view.
Smith applies proportional reasoning in his comparative analysis of ‘natural’
and ‘market prices’ that bears several traces of Newtonian influence, so much so
that some contemporary commentators perceived indeed the Wealth of Nations as
an exercise in Newtonian analysis and synthesis (see Montes 2013 and Schliesser
2017: 290–302). This seems to be the method that Smith follows too when he first
analyses the idea of a ‘natural price’ in terms of components such as ‘the rent of
the land, the wages of the labour, and the profits of the stock employed in raising,
preparing, and bringing it to market’ (Smith 1981: 72). And then in the second
step he explores those conditions that might cause the deviation of the market
price from what its natural constitution would explain.2
‘Natural price’ is the core concept of Smith’s analysis of economic processes.
It is analysed as consisting of the rent paid for the land, the wages paid for the
work, and ‘the profits of the stock employed’ while bringing any commodity
to the market. Natural price is thus compounded from these constituents as
they emerge under the circumstances of free market competition – i.e., in
the condition of ‘perfect liberty’ (Smith 1981: 72–73, 78). The market price
and the natural price of a commodity can be identical occasionally, but due
to fluctuations in the institutional and economic environment, this situation is
quite rare and does not last long. But despite its elusiveness, natural price,
pace Schliesser, is a real economic phenomenon, and not a purely fictional or
theoretical construct. It can be analyzed from a case-by-case comparison of the
causes and circumstances of deviations from the natural price. Smith’s method
while so doing can be fruitfully compared to Hume’s analysis of the natural
functioning of faculties from their several potentially disturbed functioning.
In this process Smith relies on easily available yet ‘curious facts’, as Hume
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(1776/1932: 2, 311) sees them, that function as instructive crucial instances of
analysis.
Natural price is a useful device for analyzing reality through a series of
comparisons between the natural and actual course of events that opens up the
path of successive approximation and theory refinement in a characteristically
Newtonian fashion (see Schliesser 2017: 301–302). So exploring the causes of
deviations, their proportions and interdependence, the principles of economic
change can be refined and classified. As a result, the deviations from the natural
price can be explained by two basic kinds of cause: they are either due to limited
supply of its components because of natural causes or to various institutional
causes (legal regulations concerning monopolies, labor, trade, etc.) (Smith 1981:
26, 28, 78–79). The second kind of cause is a policy issue whose effective
solution is facilitated by knowledge of the principles, and the effects of the
first kind of cause can also be mitigated. So, if a pathological state of the
‘body politick’ arises from, then a change in regulations can help, and ‘can
by degrees restore all the different branches of it to that natural, healthful, and
proper proportion which perfect liberty necessarily establishes, and which perfect
liberty can alone preserve’ (Smith 1981, 606). This analysis also reveals that there
are self-correcting mechanisms countering not only the distorting causes, but
even misplaced policies aimed at redeeming them: they arise from ‘the uniform,
constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition. [. . .] Like
the unknown principle of animal life, it frequently restores health and vigour to
the constitution, in spite, not only of the disease, but of the absurd descriptions of
the doctor’ (Smith 1981: 343).
This methodological and physiological outlook connects Smith’s project to
Black’s and Cullen’s philosophical chemistry and medical theory as well as
to Hume’s moral philosophy (see Demeter 2016). As Robert Schofield (1969:
91–93) points out, an important transformation in the British intellectual climate
took place around 1740, marking, among other developments, the emergence of
a new style of inquiry in which explanations based on ‘the mathematical analysis
of motions to find forces’ gave way to the exploration of ‘different qualities from
experimentally observed characteristics’. This new style of explanation proceeded
in terms of qualitatively different substances, instead of explaining phenomena in
in terms of the interaction of qualitatively homogenous particles. Opticks, and
especially its Queries, inspired this process, and it had a very strong presence in
Scottish universities for the rest of the century.3 These new methods were founded
‘on the principles of comparison, resemblance, affinity, analogical reasoning’, and
this is, I think, a plausible context in which Smith’s methodology can find its
proper historical home.
DOI: 10.3366/jsp.2018.0206
247
László Kontler
references
Demeter, Tamás (2016) David Hume and the Culture of Scottish Newtonianism:
Methodology and Ideology in Enlightenment Inqury, Leiden: Brill.
—— (forthcoming) ‘Philosophical Methods’, in Aaron Garrett and James Harris (eds.),
The Oxford History of Scottish Philosophy, vol. 2., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hume, David (1932) Letters of David Hume, 2 vols., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Montes, Leonidas (2013) ‘Newtonianism and Adam Smith’, in Christopher J. Berry, Maria
Pia Paganelli, and Craig Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Adam Smith, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Reill, Peter Hanns (2009) Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment, Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Schliesser, Eric (2017) Adam Smith: Systematic Philosopher and Public Thinker,
New York: Oxford University Press.
Schofield, Robert (1969) Mechanism and Materialism: British Natural Philosophy in an
Age of Reason, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Skinner, Andrew (2006) ‘Sir James Steuart, The Principles of Political Oeconomy’ in
Alexander Dow and Sheila Dow (eds.), A History of Scottish Economic Thought,
London: Routledge.
Smith, Adam (1981) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,
2 vols., Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
—— (1982) Essays on Philosophical Subjects, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
—— (2002) Theory of Moral Sentiments, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
notes
1 For a more detailed discussion see Demeter (forthcoming).
2 For a detailed discussion see Schliesser (2017: 290–301). See also Montes (2013).
James Stuart also shared these commitments, notwithstanding his substantial theoretical
disagreements with Smith; see Skinner (2006: 73–76).
3 These tendencies toward new styles of explanation and inquiry were not peculiarly
British phenomena. Discontent with mathematized philosophies of nature was
widespread in eighteenth-century Europe, particularly in France and Germany. As Reill
(2009) shows, there was a vitalistic movement in the Enlightenment which responded
to problems, particularly those of living matter, that mathematized mechanical theories
could not solve.
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Eric Schliesser’s Adam Smith is an illuminating book. It illuminates much more
than it admits. Among several other ‘big themes’ that remain by and large implicit,
but receive much new light in its pages, is nothing less than the Enlightenment,
which in the past two decades has made a forceful return to the agendas of
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